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Article 9 of the EU Water Framework Directive:  
Do we really need to calculate environmental  
and resource costs? 
Erik Gawel 
Article 9 of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) requires Member States to take 
account of the principle of recovery of the costs of water services, including environmental 
and resource costs (ERCs). Whilst legally the Member States have broad scope for discretion 
when applying Article 9, the idea that the EU legislator has effectively assigned the Member 
States a mathematical task to determine the level of cost recovery achieved for environmental 
and resource costs as well is increasingly gaining ground in the Common Implementation 
Strategy (CIS) process. The present paper shows that this strict interpretation of taking 
account of environmental and resource costs has no basis in Article 9, is conceptually 
misleading, and could even prove counter-productive for the practical application of water 
protection. 
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1. Taking account of environmental and resource costs – but how? 
In Article 9 (para. 1, sub-para. 1) of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) the EU legislator 
calls for the Member States to “take account of” the “principle of recovery of the costs” of 
“water services” including environmental and resource costs. At the same time it is up to the 
Member States to “ensure” that “water-pricing policies provide adequate incentives for users 
to use water resources efficiently, and thereby contribute to the environmental objectives of 
this Directive” (para. 1, sub-para. 2). Lastly, “in doing so” – that is, in fulfilling their 
obligations under sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 – the Member States may “have regard” to the 
“social, environmental and economic effects of the recovery of the costs” (para. 1, sub-para. 
3). 
Precisely what, in practical terms, “taking account” of environmental and resource costs 
means in the context of the “principle of recovery of the costs” for the implementation of 
Article 9 is debatable and cannot be clearly inferred from the unwieldy formulation. As a 
result, the legal literature persistently emphasises the flexibility of the methods and 
instruments available as well as the discretionary scope afforded to the Member States for the 
implementation of the assessment.[1] Nevertheless, the notion of a concrete “calculation” of 
environmental and resource costs and levels of cost recovery on the basis of monetised 
externalities (cost recovery assessment [2]) is increasingly gaining ground in the realm of 
implementation. Without further efforts to interpret Article 9 advocates of this approach 
implicitly assume that environmental and resource costs can be determined by calculation or 
deem such a calculation “desirable”.[3] The European Environment Agency (EEA), for 
example, in its stock-taking report on cost recovery states that: 
“Comparable systems for the reporting of utility costs and revenues are desirable, especially for the inclusion 
of environmental and resource costs […]. An international reporting system for the recovery of environmental 
and resource costs can be created by ensuring that the data collected […] contain the information needed to 
get an idea of whether environmental and resource costs are truly being incorporated into the costs recovered 
by the utilities.”[4] 
The European Commission also supports a “calculation” approach to ensuring that environ-
mental and resource costs are accounted for. At least this is suggested by the Commission’s 
line of argumentation in its infringement proceedings against Germany1 and also by the 
requirements of the current reporting system, which unapologetically calls for “cost data” and 
“cost recovery levels” for environmental and resource costs. In the process, environmental 
and resource costs are to be managed in the same way as market costs following the 
theoretical model of internalisation. Here, “taking account of” essentially means “calculating” 
and also treating these costs as ascertainable market costs. Corresponding methodological 
proposals have meanwhile been put forward.[5] 
However this approach leads to a dead end for a number of reasons. It can neither refer to a 
corresponding obligation from Article 9 itself, nor can it refer to the economic theory of 
environmental policy, which long ago abdicated “internalisation” as a practical guideline in 
environmental policy. Instead, the implementation process threatens to wear itself out with 
fruitless discussions on the methodological issues of data acquisition and assessment of the 
ultimately incalculable, and creates alternative, dubious derivative concepts or leads, at 
enormous expense, to a practically meaningless accounting bureaucracy. This way, little 
ground can be gained in terms of water protection, as clearly illustrated by the lack of 
                                                 
1 Infringement case 2007/2243, submitted to Court 2012. 
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progress made since 2000. Therefore the time has come to take a more pragmatic approach to 
the task of considering environmental and resource costs drawing on findings from 
environmental economics theory on the practical challenges of accounting for resource 
scarcity and external environmental burdens in environmental policy. After all, it is not as if 
the problem of accounting for environmental and resource costs emerged for the first time in 
2000 in the context of the design and implementation of Article 9 WFD. Environmental 
economists have been examining the issue for over 100 years now.[6]  
 
2. Nine arguments against focusing on calculating  
  environmental and resource costs 
2.1  Environmental and resource costs cannot be calculated 
First, to the most obvious argument: Due to irresolvable information problems the idea that 
accurate data on environmental resource costs can be collected area-wide, expressed in 
monetary terms and individually allocated according to the polluter pays principle in the 
context of a European water protection policy is illusory, both now and in the future. Those 
who continue to cling to the concept must agree on pragmatic substitutes that hold all kinds of 
methodological pitfalls. Not surprisingly then, the current debate [7] centers on well-known 
problems relating to the practical determination, assessment and recovery of environmental 
and resource costs [8]. At this point, the cost recovery policy prescribed by Article 9 visibly 
disintegrates into a largely fruitless discourse about methods and data. At any rate, 14 years 
after the WFD entered into force, not much has been brought to the table that could be put to 
practical use to recover environmental and resource costs – with no improvement in sight.   
 
2.2  There is more to taking account of environmental and resource 
  costs than identifying formal cost recovery levels  
The notion that with Article 9 the EU legislator has assigned Member States the mathematical 
task of determining on the one hand the extent of the costs to be taken into account and on the 
other hand the respective costs that have already been taken into account is apparently 
widespread. But what this perception fails to recognise is that, due to the lack of a clear cost 
analysis (100% of what exactly, assessed according to which concept?), the problem of taking 
account of environmental and resource costs cannot be reduced to the formal problem of 
calculating a level of cost recovery. Assessment problems of this kind arise even when 
financial costs are being considered which, in contrast to environmental and resource costs, 
are generally not fraught with intractable data collection and allocation problems. For 
example, to determine whether municipal water abstraction and disposal charges cover at least 
the financial costs “fully”, i.e. to 100%, it must first be clear what exactly 100% of these costs 
are. But precisely this is impossible, since it depends on the respective assessment concept for 
reportable target-based costs (refinancing, maintenance of assets, profitability comparison, 
resource utilisation)[9].  
Consequently, all other circumstances being the same, full cost recovery can result in 
simultaneously lower or higher values. Alone for asset maintenance, economic cost 
accounting theory offers dozens of sub-concepts for the assessment. Because the challenge 
faced here is not so much a mathematical problem as a complex assessment task, the solution 
cannot be simply “calculated”. For this reason, the premature claim that full cost recovery 
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water prices have been calculated for Germany in the meaning of Article 9 is 
methodologically untenable.[9] Naturally, this applies even more so to environmental and 
resource costs because here – in contrast to financial costs – not even the underlying 
quantities are known, which would have to be determined on the basis of status and function, 
and then assessed and allocated according to the polluter-pays principle. Moreover, in the 
case of environmental and resource costs there is the additional problem of determining for 
which water status these value losses would actually have to be derived, because of course the 
environmental and resource cost level changes according to water conditions. Again the same 
question arises: 100% of what? A satisfactory answer can only be given within the framework 
of a functional concept that is fully spelled out and provides sufficient information about what 
exactly accounting for environmental and resource costs aims to achieve. Here, the mere 
formal reference to 100% cost recovery, including recovery of environmental and resource 
costs, appears all too simple.    
 
2.3  Calculation problems give rise to dubious derivative concepts  
Of course it has not escaped the notice of advocates of calculated environmental and resource 
costs that a complete determination, assessment and allocation of environmental and resource 
costs according to the polluter pays principle is difficult, if not impossible. Consequently they 
tend to make to with the notion of a gradual convergence and/or pragmatic intermediate 
approaches, without losing sight of the long-term objective.[10] Two prominent examples of 
such intermediate concepts are reporting systems and the approximation approach to 
environmental and resource costs based on the cost of state measures. While reporting 
systems can only deliver preliminary information for cost recovery policy and contribute to 
transparency as well as implementation monitoring, a “cost-based approach” that proposes to 
use the costs of state measures as a (lower) reference value can serve as a material concept of 
cost recovery policy.  
Replacing environmental and resource costs with the costs of measures seems charming in 
that it promises a calculable, i.e. apparently exact solution to the environmental and resource 
cost problem based on data problems that are actually solvable. In addition, as a derivative, 
this approach appears to make a direct connection between the internalisation and assessment 
approach of economic theory and therefore enjoys its methodological authority. The fact that 
there is broad support for this approach in Germany is therefore not surprising.[11] The 
greater the pressure for a “calculable” solution to the problem of accounting for 
environmental and resource costs, the stronger the support for this “way out” is likely to 
become.  
Admittedly, two significant problems emerge from the approximation of environmental and 
resource costs based on costs of measures. First, economic theory of valuation does not lend 
itself to the approximation of environmental damages based on the costs of state measures in 
its simple form [12]. Second, the approach fails to lead to a convincing implementation of 
Article 9 in terms of water protection policy. On the contrary, here accounting for 
environmental and resource costs is essentially reduced to little more than an instrument for 
financing politically defined measures. In addition, the problem is disposed of by definition: 
If environmental and resource costs always correspond to measures that are planned anyway, 
then they are in any case accounted for and only have to be refinanced. In this way the 
additivity of both burdens (the adjustment burden of the change in behavior and additionally 
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the cost responsibility for the remaining environmental consequences) gets lost in the 
economic concept of efficient utilisation of resources – evil be to him who evil thinks. The 
sub-distribution of a politically defined amount of expenditure has just as little to do with a 
preference-based approximation of damages as with the efficiency effect of a factor price for 
water utilisation on all water-intensive production and consumption processes in the 
economy. Finally, an assessment of cost disproportionality in accordance with Article 4 WFD 
(by balancing the costs of measures against the reduced environmental and resource costs 
resulting from water protection gains) would be meaningless, because by definition both 
values would always be equal.  
The concept of using the “pure” costs of measures as a proxy for environmental and resource 
costs should therefore be rejected. Moreover such a concept is not supported by Article 9. 
Simply documenting the costs of measures that have to be refinanced anyway can hardly be 
said to represent the recovery of environmental and resource costs according to the 
internalisation of external costs approach.  
 
2.4  There is no legal obligation to provide a calculation solution 
Under Article 9(1) of the Water Framework Directive Member States are not legally obliged 
to provide a calculation solution to accounting for environmental and resource costs. This is 
also the view unanimously expressed in the relevant German literature.[1] Article 9 is 
basically open in terms of the methods and instruments applied and grants the Member States 
scope for discretion in the implementation of the assessment. However, Member States have a 
duty to report, document and justify their actions (para. 2; para. 4, sentence 2). 
Furthermore, no such legal obligation can be inferred from Annex III on the economic 
analysis referred to in Article 9, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 1 (taking account of the principle 
of recovery including environmental and resource costs “based on the economic analysis 
conducted according to Annex III”). It states that “enough information in sufficient detail” is 
required for the economic analysis “in order to […] make the relevant calculations necessary 
for taking into account under Article 9 the principle of recovery of costs of water services 
[…]”. But even the wording leaves one perplexed: What is meant by “enough information in 
sufficient detail” as a basis for “relevant calculations” which, however, are only deemed 
“necessary” so that a “principle” can be “taken into account”? On the contrary, Annex III also 
contains a clear warning not to lose sight of the relationship between marginal costs and 
marginal yield, because the collection of data for the economic analysis is to be carried out 
“taking account of the costs associated with collection of the relevant data”. The economic 
analysis according to Annex III obviously refers to the cost recovery concept to be designed 
under Article 9(1), and not the other way round. Therefore, no more can be inferred from the 
requirements of the analysis according to Annex III than what is “necessary” for the 
implementation of the respective concept to be defined by the Member States.  
The reporting obligation in Article 9(2) does not refer to a determination of environmental 
and resource costs by calculation either, but merely refers in a very general way to the need 
for the Member States design their cost recovery policies “taking account” of environmental 
and resource costs. Hence, according to the wording of Article 9(2), the Member States are 
only required to report the “planned steps towards implementing paragraph 1”. 
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From a legal perspective, therefore, although one might regret that the Member States have 
avoided binding and comprehensive obligations to take account of environmental and 
resource costs when transposing Article 9 into national legislation, attempting to retroactively 
enforce a binding legal obligation retroactively in the common implementation process 
appears not only legally but also conceptually questionable.  
 
2.5  Environmental economics does not necessarily support calculation  
approaches  
Motivated by the obvious hopelessness of its practical implementation and the overburdening 
of the legislator with data collection, environmental economists have long since abandoned 
the notion that external depreciation can be continuously and comprehensively determined, 
assessed at scarcity prices, and individually allocated to the respective polluter in order to 
create an optimal cost-benefit allocation of resources. In the history of environmental 
economic thought this concept was subsequently succeeded by the so-called standards and 
prices approach, the sole aim of which is to achieve a politically defined target in a cost-
efficient manner, followed by the demerit goods approach, which generates a price signal that 
is entirely politically defined in order to initiate sustainable structural change with no defined 
target. Reduced use of vulnerable resources is the only other requirement, the actual design of 
which is left to decentralised discovery procedures. Here, environmental and resource costs 
are only a categorical justification for price administration, and no longer provide a basis for 
the calculation of the expected costs of the use of resources. 
In fact, in the history of economic thinking taking environmental and resource costs into 
account in environmental policy was never designed to fully allocate damage functions: as 
early as 1912 Pigou proposed the economic concept of state internalisation with an 
abstraction that specifically sought to confront the polluter with the concept of “marginal 
damage at the optimum”; here full recovery of environmental and resource costs from the 
polluter is not the intention. Instead, a fictitious burden of payment falls to the state, which is 
only a vague representation rather than a concrete illustration of the residual damage at the 
optimum. This is intended to serve a very specific environmental and resource cost allocation 
function, namely, to bring about behavioral change that will lead to an “optimal” private use 
of environmental resources.   
Therefore, economic theory does not necessarily lend itself to general statements about cost 
recovery levels (of environmental damages) of 100%. The reverse conclusion is that in order 
to implement the principle of recovery of costs there is a need for a recovery concept, i.e. a 
statement about the exact purpose to be served. Internalisation through a Pigouvian tax 
follows a very particular concept of recovery: it focuses above all on the short-term marginal 
effects of controlling behavior and not on the full recovery of costs in the sense of a 
compensation or adjustment function for a certain level of environmental damage. Despite the 
“internalisation” approach, the burden of payment for the remaining use does not correspond 
to the environmental and resource costs at the optimum but at best represents them. In 
comparison, the concept of cost recovery in Article 9 is clearly broader and encompasses not 
only the long-term effects and income effects of environmental and resource cost allocation 
but also the factors of cost compensation and financing. This is reinforced by the embedding 
of the recovery of costs according to Article 9(1) in the economic analysis, the express 
stipulation of the polluter pays principle, and by the cost correction requirement between the 
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different water use sectors in Article 9(1), sub-paragraph 2, 2nd indent and, finally, by the 
general purpose of the Directive under Article 1 to establish a “framework” for overall 
sustainable water management. In other words: the functional objective of the allocation of 
environmental and resource costs in this complex steering context has to be fully spelled out 
in the cost recovery policy and cannot be reduced to the calculation of a percentage (cost 
recovery level). The economic theory of environmental policy at any rate does not deliver any 
mandatory blueprint for this task.   
Contemporary economic theory of environmental policy continues to refer to the theoretical 
concept of internalisation as a mere source of orientation and justification. However, this 
concept is no longer expected to guide environmental policy on the practical distribution of 
the burden. Endres speaks here of the residual function of an “indispensable vision”.[13] 
Incidentally, such an “enlightened” perspective also makes it possible to focus on simple 
improvements to taking account of environmental and resource costs vis-à-vis a situation of 
non-consideration. In this way even “small” improvements can be appreciated. At the same 
time, such a perspective can avoid the problems associated with focusing on an imaginary 
internalisation scenario: becoming discouraged (postponement until problems are solved), 
resorting to dubious derivatives (costs of measures as proxy variables) or “calculating” 
fictitious figures with whatever data are at hand (formal cost recovery levels of whatever). 
Although Hansjürgens/Messner also initially assume the principle of monetisation and 
internalisation, they clearly identify, in this respect, the need for a practical process only 
guided by the idea of internalisation.[14] In a similar way, Ammermüller ultimately views the 
meaning of Article 9 less as a numbers-based glass bead game than as an instrument of 
information and transparency that explicitly forces the Member States to process hitherto 
forgotten costs and the related conflicts of interest and to continuously comment and report on 
these (“cost transparency”).[15]  
These reduced expectations do not contradict the fact that the economic assessment of 
environmental goods is highly developed, both in theory and in practice, and progress 
continues to be made in this area.[16] For certain projects that focus on one particular 
problem, at great expense to publically funded research, if one is prepared to invest time and 
apply numerous valuation methods, each with its own advantages and serious disadvantages, 
as well as a comprehensive set of assumptions and conditions, it is certainly possible to 
perform an assessment of practically all environmental goods and their value aspects in the 
context of the total economic value [17] – even, if desired, in monetary terms. But what 
economic valuation theory cannot do is provide an all-encompassing, affordable and readily 
applicable assessment of all the environmental and scarcity impacts from highly diverse water 
uses, including tracing point sources among a complex system of dischargers, that in its 
implementation would yield scientifically “unambiguous” results, create political consensus 
and put an end to legal uncertainty.[18]  
There is another problem here: not only would Article 9 suddenly be subject to a set of 
methods not prescribed by the EU legislator. Given the practical impossibility of 
implementing the “internalisation” approach – as described above – there would also be a 
need to resort to derivative supporting concepts that would allow a more “pragmatic” 
approach (expert opinions, cost of measures approach, etc.). While most authors insist on the 
fundamental need for a calculation approach to environmental and resource costs,[19] the 
numerous and disparate “pragmatic solutions” developed to support the implementation of the 
approach have little in common and really only serve to confirm the methodological pluralism 
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and discretionary scope afforded to the Member States when accounting for environmental 
and resource costs. In this way pragmatism inevitably turns into casuistry. However, in the 
process, these pragmatic strategies forfeit much of the legitimacy that economic theory 
seemed to attribute to the approach: precisely because many pragmatic options are open, none 
appears particularly compelling. This applies in particular to calculation results that only 
appear to be accurate: “bookkeeping”, e.g. on the recovery of the costs of state measures has 
very little to do with the internalisation of external environmental effects and the individual 
allocation of true-cost scarcity prices, but apparently it should be vested with its economic 
authority and simultaneously also even declared as “the only alternative”. 
 
2.6  Calculation approaches are costly and time-consuming  
Efforts to design a calculation approach to accounting for environmental and resource costs 
have so far barely progressed beyond the drawing board because of the complexity of the 
problem and the almost insurmountable difficulties of finding an intersubjectively verifiable 
way to determine, assess and individually allocate environmental and resource costs. Many 
see a reporting system as desirable, but as an information instrument it can only serve as an 
initial step in the actual cost recovery policy and is currently not even close to being available, 
despite the fact that the accounting and efficiency requirements of Article 9 have been fully 
effective at the latest since 2010. On the other hand the approach is undeniably complex and 
time-consuming. If and when it will be able to achieve its self-defined objectives is entirely 
uncertain. One must accept that for the foreseeable future the calculation approach can only 
meet the present immediate requirements of the WFD – accounting, incentivisation and 
efficiency – through continuous efforts to refine the methodological and informational aspects 
of what is essentially merely a pre-reporting system. Cleary, that is not enough.  
In this connection, the costs and possible benefits of an elaborate reporting system should also 
be critically evaluated. Annex III of the WFD explicitly states that the “required” collection of 
information should take account of an acceptable cost-income ratio. Excessive collection of 
data or extensive documentation of reporting with no practical utility for cost recovery policy 
is hardly in line with this requirement.  
 
2.7  Calculation approaches distract from the real challenges  
Under Article 9 the Member States are required, here and now, to independently formulate a 
cost recovery policy, to report on this policy and to document and justify any planned 
exemptions. However this does not mean that the EU legislator has called on the Member 
States and the EU Commission to re-address a hitherto unsolved problem which, after 100 
years of debate among environmental economists, has been declared practically unsolvable. 
Nor does it mean that the Member States are required to take a step-by-step approach towards 
an imaginary ideal state by implementing an open-ended, costly process to refine methods and 
improve the data situation. If that were so the principle of recovery of the costs of water 
services (including environmental and resource costs) would not be implementable in practice 
at any time in the foreseeable future. The current focus of the implementation debate on 
questions of data collection and methods distracts from the real challenges of cost recovery 
policy. What’s more, valuable resources are tied up and there is a risk of creating a 
bureaucratic system of ineffective reporting of environmental and resource costs that – 
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fittingly – could be the subject of debate for a long time to come. In the meantime, there 
would be little pressure to provide an effective solution to accounting for environmental and 
resource costs in the context of a practical cost recovery policy.   
In the area of agriculture, for example, there are certainly a number of interesting, immediate 
implementation tasks that do not involve extensive bookkeeping of environmental and 
resource costs or decades-long examination of open questions about methods and data. And 
the information that forms the basis for action is already available today: Agriculture is 
explicitly named in Article 9(1) 2nd indent as one of the water use sectors required to make an 
adequate contribution to the recovery of the costs of water services according to the polluter 
pays principle. However, in reality, when it comes to water protection the principle of the 
polluter profits continues to apply almost across the board in the German agricultural sector. 
This is clearly in conflict with the requirements of Article 9.[20] In this case, there is no need 
to close the information gap or clarify difficult methodological questions in order to correct 
water pricing policy. This problem can be tackled directly at political level.  
 
2.8  Calculation approaches are not required  
  from a conceptual point of view 
All of the mentioned problems and shortcomings appear to be avoidable because ultimately 
there is no need to resort to a calculated determination of environmental and resource costs. In 
the search for a feasible and expedient method of “taking account” of environmental and 
resource costs, environmental economic theory has for decades demonstrated practical ways 
of do so without getting caught up with the comprehensive determination of, say, existence 
values and option values for fish populations; since 1976 the German Waste Water Charge 
serves as an example of how environmental and resource costs can be accounted for in 
practice without succumbing to overwhelming information requirements or postponing taking 
account of environmental and resource costs until a perfect internalisation of externalities 
appears practicable (i.e. until some never-never day), as has been called for by some. 
The fact that this process is not likely to result in an area-wide landscape of charges is 
primarily due to the specific requirements of the different water-related scarcity problems to 
be solved and the respective allocative limitations of environmental charges.[21] To that 
extent, ideas about “all-embracing” water use charges [22] are probably illusory from the 
outset.[23] On the other hand, however, traditional command-and-control approaches which 
systematically do not take account of the environmental and resource costs that result from 
the respective remaining water uses and cannot make demands for resource efficiency, are 
unlikely to provide a comprehensive and long-term solution to the specific requirements of 
Article 9.[24] Plainly, if one were to infer that the only task assigned under Article 9 is the 
implementation of regulatory measures already required by the remaining articles of the 
Water Framework Directive, Article 9 itself would be completely superfluous.  
Ultimately, in the context of a cost recovery policy articulated in Article 9, there seems to be 
no alternative to implementing water use charges according to the pragmatic demerit goods 
approach. It will be up to the individual Member States to transparently determine where and 
in what form this should reasonably be introduced in water protection to support cost recovery 
policy. With the help of demeritorizing charges environmental and resource costs will be 
politically determined, namely via “political selling prices”. The principle criticism brought 
against this decisionist approach, on the other hand, is not convincing (see section 3). 
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2.9  Calculation approaches weaken the political legitimation  
  of cost recovery policy  
Finally, the “calculation approach” also fails to recognise that spuriously accurate calculations 
are susceptible to political resistance: If a national legislator instead of relying on political 
evaluation relies on one of numerous scientifically conceivable calculation results that can 
ultimately provide only possible estimations, the political legitimation of the environmental 
policy action is likely to be far more fragile than if no such reference were used. This is 
because interest groups can easily present contrary calculations, raise doubts about the 
methods used, and play off certain costs to those affected against the uncertain benefits of 
accounting for environmental and resource costs or, in short, undermine the environmental 
policy argument. As an example, currently the “study market” for the monetisation of the 
environmental costs of climate change offers values of between 0 and 120 euros per ton of 
CO2 equivalent.[25] Obviously, such a quantification approach that demands too much 
detailed knowledge in fact does weaken climate policy action instead of supporting it. 
Against this background it is no coincidence that for instance groups representing the interests 
of those required to pay German waste water charges have already gladly seized upon the 
argument that a calculation of environmental and resources costs, whose representation 
definitely still refers to the charge in the context of the demoritisation approach, has not taken 
place and so there is no legitimation for the charge rates.[26] Here, it is obvious that it is 
practically impossible to “calculate” (continuously) a uniform charge rate in a manner that is 
even partly methodologically robust using the internalisation or even the standards and prices 
approach. Relying on “calculations” that are both impracticable and methodologically 
contentious would neither provide a better legitimation of the “selling prices” nor support 
water protection. Under these circumstances the state is still clearly responsible for policy 
design. In doing so it would be well advised to steer clear of attempts to legitimise its actions 
on the basis of spuriously accurate, exhaustive scientific calculations. On the other hand, the 
non-availability of such calculations should not be allowed to impede state action. 
 
3.  Response to the criticism of politically defined environmental  
  and resource costs 
If the amount and individual allocation of environmental and resource costs in the context of a 
cost recovery policy is determined politically by the legislator using flat-rate values – as in the 
case of the so-called “demerit goods approach” of waste water charges and water abstraction 
fees with no defined target – then the requirement to “take account” under Article 9 will be 
implemented on the basis of a decisionist approach. This approach has met with criticism 
from several quarters. For example, some have expressed concern that purely politically 
defined environmental and resource costs would fail to meet the objectives of Article 9 [1] 
and carry the risk of “inefficient resource allocation”[2]. In addition, referring to the history of 
its origins, a purely political definition of environmental and resource costs is “not planned” 
by the EU legislator.[3] 
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3.1  Are the legal requirements being watered down? 
Is there a danger that the requirements of Article 9 could be “watered down” by a “purely 
political definition” of environmental and resource costs? This opinion, which the EU 
Commission evidently shares, seems surprising in legal terms considering the effort – 
sometimes seen as fruitless – invested in inferring any binding “dictates” at all from Article 9 
paragraph 1, but particularly from sub-paragraph 1. At the same time, given the amount of 
conflict over the interpretation of Article 9 and the difficulties of making even the term 
“environmental and resource costs” workable, it is surprising that pragmatic implementation 
concepts should be classified as insufficient when a reference scenario for what allegedly 
could be “sufficient” is not even available. The general concern regarding the insufficient 
implementation of the cost recovery requirement more likely results from the complex 
legislative history than to serious methodological objections to certain solutions, especially 
since they have no scientific basis in environmental economics (section 2.5). 
The various relativisations in sub-paragraph 1 (“principle”, “taking account”) and sub-
paragraph 3 (a further proportionality analysis of the “effects of the recovery”) refer in equal 
measure to the circumstances, extent and manner of “taking account” of environmental and 
resource costs. It cannot be reasonably assumed that the circumstances and the extent of the 
cost recovery, including environmental and resource costs, will be left to the legislators of the 
Member States, but not the manner in which the environmental and resource costs are 
included.[4] Article 9 is clearly riddled with discretionary scope for the Member States; but 
the barely achievable determination, assessment and allocation of environmental and resource 
costs of all things should be exempt from this? At any rate the far-reaching power of 
relativisation in sub-paragraph 3 does not provide for a methodologically discretion-free 
implementation. At the same time, one should keep in mind that, in general, according to 
Article 288 TFEU the legal institution of the “directive” is only binding for Member States 
with regard to the effect to be achieved (in this case: taking account of the environmental and 
resource costs); the form (determination of the environmental and resource costs) and 
methods (charge, tax, regulation) used to implement a directive are at the discretion of the 
Member States. 
Besides, at least in the area of German national jurisprudence, it has long been acknowledged 
that the determination of costs (say, for setting a charge rate) must include political decisionist 
elements given that the current findings from the field of environmental economics do not 
allow a more precise determination in practice.[5] Particularly when it comes to charges and 
taxes the national legislator has decision-making scope and is allowed to make 
generalisations. In the debate on the allocation of environmental and resource costs within the 
context of Article 9 WFD no such solid legal foundation has yet been achieved due to the lack 
of relevant EU case law. Nevertheless, it can be concluded from the decades-long legal 
treatment of waste water charges and water abstraction fees at national level that taking 
account of environmental and resource costs through demeritorisation charges also constitutes 
an adequate approach to the implementation of Article WFD.[6] 
 
3.2  Estimation problems and inefficiency 
Concerns voiced about the “inefficient allocation of resources” [7] arising from purely 
politically defined estimations of the allocation of environmental and resource costs fail to 
convince. Apart from the fact that all of the available assessment methods – which 
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incidentally contradict one another – merely provide estimations, temporarily abandoning the 
allocation of environmental and resource costs or selecting a different estimation method is 
not likely to get rid of the fuzziness problem. In this respect spuriously accurate calculations 
represent little more than possible estimation alternatives that are considerably more 
expensive, available later, open to dispute over assumptions and must be considered “out of 
date” after a short time. One cannot seriously claim here that the national legislator is tied to a 
particular “calculation result” in order to overcome the fuzziness/uncertainty of estimations. 
This is precisely ruled out by discretionary scope granted to Member States under Article 9.  
 
3.3  The political paradox: To wait for the impossible  
  or to do the obvious? 
Concerns over a politically induced dilution of the legal requirement become virtually 
paradoxical when the same authors who propose postponing the more ambitious 
internalisation approach until further notice due to its lack of implementability in the same 
breath declare the approach alone to be sufficient.[8] The alternative of not being in a position 
to implement a theoretically ambitious concept at all for the foreseeable future due to 
insurmountable practical problems as opposed to being in a position to implement a 
pragmatic, tried and tested, and by all means expedient concept immediately and across the 
board at an acceptable cost, and the fact that the pragmatic approach falls behind the 
theoretical concept can hardly be interpreted as a weakening of the requirement to take 
account of environmental and resource costs in practice. Obviously, quite the opposite is the 
case: it is the pragmatic accounting concept of e. g. demerit charges that makes it at all 
possible to fulfill the task of “including” environmental and resource costs when applying the 
principle of the recovery of costs.  
 
3.4  The lack of enforcement monitoring and vested interests  
  in a calculation approach to taking environmental and resource  
  costs into account  
Clearly, the reservations expressed against a “political determination” are driven by concerns 
about an “undersize scenario”, where the Member States impede the inclusion of 
environmental and resource costs through political settlements. Standardised reporting and 
benchmarking systems may indeed be desirable in this regard and could create the necessary 
transparency for monitoring the enforcement of Article 9 WFD. But this would do nothing to 
change the discretionary scope granted to Member States at national level under Article 9. 
The bemoaned enforcement deficit is plainly written into in the article itself. 
The EU Commission’s understandable concerns about the otherwise elusive control of the 
enforcement of Article 9 should not mislead one into believing that the calculation route is the 
one dictated by Article 9, or even that it is the most practical and convincing one. Similarly, 
one should not be misguided by the understandable pride of the advocates of economic 
valuation or their interests in an expansive assessment bureaucracy which they could gainfully 
serve for decades to come if the calculation approach were to be established.  
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3.5  Interim conclusions 
On the whole, the arguments put forward against a political-decisionist allocation of 
environmental and resource costs are not convincing: The task of implementing Article 9 is 
necessarily connected with considerable political-administrative scope for decision-making 
and this is just as unlikely to be “narrowed” by an internalisation concept that is impossible to 
implement in practice as by ineffectual attempts to replace the assessment with a pragmatic 
calculation model or derivative concepts that, for instance, simply refer to the costs of 
measures taken as proof of the allocation of environmental and resource costs. The 
implementation of water use charges, which place a burden on the “remaining use”, i.e. 
without “cut-off” environmental and resource costs, but operate on the basis of a political 
settlement might in practice contribute much more to the recovery of costs, to reducing water 
contamination and to reaching good status than endless, fruitless discussions about “even 
better” internalisation concepts, the collection of irrelevant data or a false solution defined on 
the basis of costs of measures – even if the charge rate is defined “only politically” and not on 
the basis of full knowledge of environmental and resource costs. Article 9 WFD is open in 
equal measure to this decisionist approach. In any case a political determination of 
environmental and resource costs that however takes full account of remaining use is more 
likely to result in fewer deviations from a perfect, yet impossible, internalisation than an 
arbitrary approximation of environmental and resource costs on the basis of costs of measures 
which, in addition, are to be dropped once the environmental objective has been reached, as 
has been repeatedly proposed.  
Both European community law and German constitutional law grant the legislator broad 
scope for the absorption of special benefits and for “taking account” of environmental and 
resource costs. A comprehensive monetisation and area-wide individual allocation of external 
costs according to the polluter pays principle is not practicable and also not necessarily 
required by subparagraph 1, which merely refers to “taking account” of a “principle”. Relying 
on impracticable “calculations” that are open to attack in terms of methodology and therefore 
give cause for endless political wrangling would neither achieve a better legitimation of the 
cost recovery policy nor contribute to water protection. Here, the “environmental state” must 
continue to assume responsibility for policy design.  
 
4.  Farewell to ERC accounting? 
The concept of “calculating” environmental and resource costs has clearly led to an impasse 
in the debate on the implementation of Article 9 WFD. The basic idea behind the approach 
has simultaneously degenerated into a pragmatic casuistry of barely manageable proxies and 
interim solutions. Similar to the costs-of-measures approach, dubious derivative concepts are 
being offered which are far removed from the actual task assigned by Article 9. The fact that 
efforts to come up with a practicable “accounting concept” have on the whole been 
unsatisfactory has led to growing pressure to draw on the findings from environmental 
economic theory on accounting for environmental and resource costs and to systematically 
implement Article 9 on the basis of these findings.  
However, two opposing and powerful forces currently stand in the way of the effective 
implementation of the principle of cost responsibility according to Article 9 as part of the 
regulatory framework for sustainable and efficient water management.  
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On the one hand, particularly in the German legal literature, remarkable efforts have been 
made to avoid and resist the requirements of Article 9. These include claims that the 
regulatory content is both unclear and unclarifiable, that the traditional command-and-control 
approach and the (substantively clearly deviating) cost recovery principle in the individual 
federal state laws on municipal charges are sufficient, a narrow interpretation of the term 
“services”, calls for the task of taking account of environmental and resource costs to be 
abolished once the environmental objective has been reached, and the suggestion that 
environmental and resource costs should be determined on the basis of the costs of state 
measures that are anyway required. Such arguments render Article 9 totally superfluous as an 
independent and special component of the regulatory framework for sustainable water 
management which emphasises and demands that resource users assume cost responsibility in 
the interests of water conservation. However, this marginalisation strategy does not have a 
large following, and rightly so: Article 9 – at the legislative level – introduces a 
fundamentally new aspect of water management.[9] The Member States are obliged to take on 
the task.  
However, adversity looms on the opposing side too. Those who claim that Article 9 has 
finally put an end to the long failed internalisation strategy in environmental policy are not 
doing water protection any favors either. They may even make the achievable successes of a 
strategy of cost responsibility more unlikely by focusing on a distant illusion, the great 
internalisation solution, and by their tendency to delegitimise less complex decisionist 
approaches. Even an enormous assessment and accounting bureaucracy dedicated to recording 
sector-specific cost recovery levels and heaps of studies on their methodological suitability, 
which would appear to be on the horizon, are not likely to be able to substitute for the power 
of policy to solve very simple issues such as how to cover the consequential costs of 
agricultural water uses. Individual Member States have long been demonstrating how the 
principle of cost responsibility can be satisfied in the interests of water protection with 
pragmatic approaches such as the waste water charge (Germany) or pesticide charges 
(Denmark, Sweden) .[10] The EU legislator explicitly does not call for comprehensive and 
binding cost responsibility in the area of water management in Article 9. The resulting lack of 
obligation cannot now be enforced after the fact in the context of implementation. This seems 
not only legally questionable but risks getting mired in a fruitless ERC documentation 
bureaucracy. In this way, valuable resources are directed into dubious channels and much 
time is lost.  
Therefore, incorporating the state of knowledge in environmental economic theory into the 
practical implementation of cost responsibility policy seems to make more sense and at the 
same time the objectives of the Water Framework Directive would be better served than 
continuing to try to solve the obviously unsolvable internalisation problem. A water 
protection policy that consistently takes into account that even free ecosystem services come 
at a cost to society (for example, legally conceded residual uses) and administers the related 
cost responsibility in the light of findings from environmental economics according to the 
polluter pays principle, but with a discriminating use of instruments (requirements and 
prohibitions, charges, fee calculation rules), is within the meaning of Article 9 WFD. A 
standardised but lean reporting system and/or a benchmarking approach that is manageable in 
terms of administrative cost could create the necessary transparency between water uses and 
water protection and stimulate competition between the different Member States’ systems. 
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So, in terms of practical design, what form should an information and reporting instrument 
take that will also allow the Commission to determine whether the Member States have met 
their obligations under Article 9 WFD without providing a specific, centrally defined concept 
for taking account of environmental and resource costs? This question is not easy to answer. 
Although the literature contains a number of different proposals[11], they are still too heavily 
shaped by the monetisation ideal. It appears crucial that the central transparency function of 
reporting should place stronger demands on procedural and conceptual elements, i.e. 
Member States should be required to self-report about how their cost recovery policy intends 
to take account of environmental and resource costs and in what way national monitoring is to 
take place rather than to provide a standardised calculation or percentage result that 
consistently follows a particular methodological approach. Such an approach is not required 
by Article 9 and at best might become established as a conventional method at supranational 
level at some time in the future, or perhaps never.  
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